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RECENT DAMAGING EARTHQUAKES IN JAPAN, 2003-2008  
 
Robert Kayen, Ph.D. P.E. 
U.S. Geological Survey 
345 Middlefield Road 




During the last six years, from 2003-2008, Japan has been struck by three significant and damaging earthquakes: The most recent M6.6 Niigata 
Chuetsu Oki earthquake of July 16, 2007 off the coast of Kashiwazaki City, Japan; The M6.6 Niigata Chuetsu earthquake of October 23, 2004, 
located in Niigata Prefecture in the central Uonuma Hills; and the M8.0 Tokachi Oki Earthquake of September 26, 2003 effecting southeastern 
Hokkaido Prefecture.  These earthquakes stand out among many in a very active period of seismicity in Japan.  Within the upper 100 km of the 
crust during this period, Japan experienced 472 earthquakes of magnitude 6, or greater.  Both Niigata events affected the south-central region of 
Tohoku Japan, and the Tokachi-Oki earthquake affected a broad region of the continental shelf and slope southeast of the Island of Hokkaido.  
This report is synthesized from the work of scores of Japanese and US researchers who led and participated in post-earthquake reconnaissance 
of these earthquakes:  their noteworthy and valuable contributions are listed in an extended acknowledgements section at the end of the paper. 
 
During the Niigata Chuetsu Oki event of 2007, damage to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, structures, infrastructure, and 
ground were primarily the product of two factors: (1) high intensity motions from this moderate-sized shallow event, and (2) soft, poor 
performing, or liquefiable soils in the coastal region of southwestern Niigata Prefecture.  Structural and geotechnical damage along the 
slopes of dunes was ubiquitous in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa region. The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake was the most significant to 
affect Japan since the 1995 Kobe earthquake.  Forty people were killed, almost 3,000 were injured, and many hundreds of landslides 
destroyed entire upland villages. Landslides were of all types; some dammed streams, temporarily creating lakes threatening to overtop 
their new embankments and cause flash floods and mudslides. The numerous landslides resulted, in part, from heavy rain associated with 
Typhoon Tokage. The earthquake forced more than 100,000 people into temporary shelters, and as many as 10,000 displaced from their 
upland homes for several years.  Total damages was estimated by Japanese authorities at US$40 billion, making this the second most 
costly disaster in history, after the 1995 Kobe earth-quake. The 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake was the third event of magnitude 8.0+ to 
strike the southeastern portion of Hokkaido in the last 50 years. The event produced tsunami run-ups along the shoreline of southern 
Hokkaido that reached maximum heights of 4 meters.  Accelerations recorded by seismic networks of Hokkaido indicated a high intensity 
motion region from Hiroo area to Kushiro City, with a PGA values in the range of 0.35 to 0.6g.  Despite high acceleration levels, the 





During the past five years Japan has been struck by three 
significant and damaging earthquakes: The most recent M6.6 
Niigata Chuetsu Oki (offshore) earthquake of July 16, 2007 off 
the coast of Kashiwazaki City, Japan; the M6.6 Niigata Chuetsu 
earthquake of October 23, 2004, as located in Niigata Prefecture 
in the central Uonuma Hills; and the M8.0 Tokachi Oki 
(offshore) Earthquake of September 26, 2003 effecting 
southeastern Hokkaido Prefecture.  These earthquakes stand out 
among many in a very active period of seismicity in Japan 
between January 1, 2003 and the present.  In the upper 100 km 
of the crust during this period, Japan experienced 472 
earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater (Figure 1).  Both Niigata 
events affected the south-central region of Niigata Prefecture, 
and the Tokachi-Oki earthquake affected a broad region of the 
continental shelf and slope southeast of Hokkaido. 
 
These three earthquakes, though the most significant, were not 
the only damaging events of the past five years.  In 2005, 
northwestern Kyushu was shaken by the magnitude 7.0 
Fukuoka-ken Seiho-oki earthquake (Fukuoka western offshore) 
in Fukuoka Prefecture, March 20, 2005.  Shaking lasted for 
approximately 50 seconds. The quake occurred on the offshore 
projection of the Kego fault in the Genkai Sea, The earthquake 
resulted in one person was killed, and over one thousand injured. 
 





Figure 1:  Damaging earthquakes in Japan, 2003-2008. Seven primary events are plotted against 472 events in the upper 100km of crust, of 
magnitude 6 or greater, that struck Japan in that timeframe.  Events where centered in the Tokachi region of Hokkaido Prefecture; The 
southern central region of Niigata Prefecture;  The Sendai Bay region of Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures; along the subduction zone offshore 
Wakayama and Ise; and an unusual large event in northwestern Kyushu near Fukuoka. 
 
Old homes made of soil-stucco and bamboo lathe (tsuchi-kabe 
method) and covered with heavy ceramic Kawara roof tiles 
accounted for almost all of the damage.   On Genkai-jima, an 
island offshore Fukuoka, landslides and structural collapses of 
homes forced the evacuation of all the residents. 
 
On 26 May 2003, a deep M7.0 quake occurred along the Pacific 
plate boundary injuring over 100 people in Iwate and Miyagi 
prefectures. No death has been reported. Property damage was, 
again, limited to several hundred old homes. Landslides were 
observed in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture and in Sumita, 
Iwate Prefecture.   Two years later, on August 16, 2005 another 
Miyagi ken oki event struck Sendai Bay. This time M7.2 struck 
Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures.  Several fatalities occurred at a 
structural collapse of a pool roof Sendai city, Miyagi prefecture, 
and over a dozen injuries were reported.  
 
On the Japan sea coast on the Noto peninsula in Ishikawa 
Prefecture, a M6.7 earthquake struck on March 25, 2007.  The 
earthquake was remarkable for the general lack of damage, 
liquefaction or landsliding. One death was reported in the city of 
Wajima and several hundred were injured.    
 
The three damaging events, reported here, are described 
beginning with the most recent.  These events were each the 
focus of reconnaissance activities of the EERI (Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute) and GEER (Geo-Engineering 
Earthquake Engineering Reconnaissance) activities of the US 
National Science Foundation.  The geo-engineering observations 
of the earthquake events described below are the product of the 
reconnaissance activities and its’ participants.  The contributors 
to the reports and articles for each of the events are listed in the  
extended acknowledgements at the end of the paper. 
  
(I)  THE JULY 16, 2007 M6.6 NIIGATA-
CHUETSU OKI EARTHQUAKE 
The M6.6 mainshock of the Niigata Chuetsu Oki (offshore) 
earthquake occurred at 10:13 a.m local time on July 16, 2007, 
and was followed by a sequence of strong aftershocks (Figure 
2). The event had a shallow focal depth of 8 km and struck in the 
Japan Sea immediately offshore Kariwa.  The quake affected an 
approximately 100 km-wide area along the coastal areas of 
southwestern Niigata prefecture and triggered numerous ground 
failures as far inland as the Uonuma Hills located approximately 
50 km inland - the source area of the 2004 Niigata Chuetsu 
earthquake.  
In Niigata prefecture, the JMA seismic intensity was 6+ (IX in 
MMI) in Kariwa-cho, Kashiwazaki city, Nagaoka city, and also 
Ohzuna-machi in Nagano prefecture. The downtown 
Kashiwazaki City  K-NET site recorded a PGA of 0.67g.  The 
earthquake resulted in eleven fatalities and nearly two thousand 
injuries.  Close to 1,100 collapses of residential structures 
occurred almost exclusively in old bamboo and stuccoed post-
and-lintel structures with heavy kawara tile roofs.  Many of 
these collapses were associated with displacements on the slopes 
of sand dune deposits or liquefied ground.  Damage occurred in 
lifeline utilities of gas, water, and electricity and to the world’s 
largest nuclear power plant, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility.  
The power plant was in the region of highest iso-seismal 
intensity. Expanded reports on the earthquake can be found at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1365/ (Kayen et al., 2007),  
www.eeri.org , and gees.usc.edu/GEER/
The spatial position and severity of ground failures and 
structural damage are archived in a Google Earth database at 
http://walrus.wr.usgs.gov/infobank/n/nii07jp/html/n-ii-07-
jp.sites.kmz, which contains a comprehensive explanation of 
each site. The use of Google Earth as an earthquake 
investigation tool is presented in paper 3.55 of Session 3 of this 
conference (Kayen et al, 2008a).   High-resolution laser-mapped 
data sets of the most significant structural and geotechnical 
damage features were collected for preservation using a 
terrestrial LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) system of the 
USGS.  
 
Figure 2:  Main shock and aftershock pattern of the 16 July 2007 
Niigata Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake.  The estimated moment 
magnitude of the event is M6.6.  The aftershock pattern is useful 
for defining the principal rupture plane of the event.  The worlds 
largest nuclear power plant, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility of 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), is sited in the 
epicentral region and experienced the strongest recorded 
motions of the earthquake 
 
Seismological Aspects Of The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki 
Earthquake 
Niigata is located in a subduction zone near the boundary 
between the Amur plate and the Okhotsk plate (two relatively 
small plates that lie between the larger Eurasia and Pacific 
plates).  The moment magnitude of the mainshock of this event 
was estimated to be 6.6 using teleseismic data (USGS) and 6.7 
using regional data.  The Japan Meteorological Agency assigned 
a magnitude of 6.8 to the mainshock. 
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Figure 3: Acceleration response spectra for a damping 
coefficient of 5%. From top to bottom: NIG016, NIG017, 
NIG018, NIG019.  The left panel is the EW component, the 
middle panel is the NS component, the right panel is the Z 
component.  The horizontal axes represent frequency, in Hz, and 
the vertical axes represent absolute acceleration as a fraction of 
the acceleration of gravity. 
The Niigata earthquake was a buried reverse-slip earthquake. 
The hypocenter had an estimated depth of 8 km (NRI ESDP, 
2007).  Two potential planes of faulting are unresolved, as 
aftershock locations fell on both planes. The rupture length is 
estimated to be 30 km and the down-dip fault width is estimated 
to be 22 km for both planes.  The inferred location of the 
hypocenter is at the northeast end of both planes and the rupture 
is inferred to have progressed from the northeast toward the 
southwest.  Slip models for both rupture planes show a single 
strong asperity in the western end of the rupture.  The maximum 
computed slip is 3.5m. 
The Japanese nationwide strong motion network, K-net, 
recorded the earthquake at 390 stations, with 20 stations within 
50 km.  The accelerograms obtained at station NIG018 (close to 
the fault plane and within the area where damage was heavier) 
have unusually low frequency content that is most likely due to 
liquefaction below the site.  Acceleration response spectra 
computed for a damping coefficient of 5% are shown in Fig. 3.   
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant 
 
The worlds largest nuclear power plant, owned by Tokyo 
Electric Power Corporation (TEPCO) is located 7 km from the 
epicenter reported by K-NET, 10 to 20 km above the fault plane 
dipping southeast and 3 km above the northwest dipping plane. 
and instrumented at 99 locations.  The motions at 33 locations 
with a new sensor system were recorded, but unfortunately the 
recordings at the other 66 older instrument locations, including 
two free-field down-hole arrays and most of the structural 
arrays, were lost with the exception of the peak values.  The 
ground motion data on the old system could not automatically 
transmit due to communication congestion, and aftershooks 
triggered the recorders and overwrote the buffer containing the 
mainshock recordings. The 33 recordings of the new system 
included 27 from a majority of the reactor and turbine buildings 
and one 4-depth free-field array at the Service Hall. The data 
indicates a large range in the foundation motions for the EW 
component with PGA values ranging over a factor of two (322-
to-680 gal).  The NS component shows more similar values 
(267-to-311 gals).  The large range in the EW component values 
is likely due to different soil structure interaction (SSI) effects at 
different units and spatial variation of the ground motion over 
short distances probably due to the near-fault rupture mechanism 
(Fig 4a and 4b).  The large range of PGA values on the EW 
component shows the need for multiple recordings at NPP sites 




Figure 4a  East – West peak accelerations (cm/sec/sec) in and 
around Unit 1 (From TEPCO, 2007). 
 
Figure 4b  Peak accelerations in and around Unit 5 Reactor 
(From TEPCO, 2007) 
 
 
 The performance of the facility was mixed: the main structures 
did not suffer significant damage, but a fire started and 
radioactive material was released.   There was no loss of life and 
the emergency shutdown system, which had been set to be 
triggered by accelerations exceeding 120gal, operated 
successfully. In structures surrounding the primary facilities of 
the plant, a fire broke out in an electrical transformer. Radiation 
leaks were caused by spilling of water from used nuclear fuel 
cooling pools, failure of joints in exhaust pipes, and the falling 
of drums containing low-radiation nuclear waste. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Damaged road at the nuclear power plant  (Kayen et 
al. 2007). 
 
Structural and road damage that was observed was related to 
problems with foundation soils, including liquefaction (Figure 5) 
, embankment failure, settlement and distress of footings, and a 
landslide. Joints of piping resting on isolated footings and 
expansion joints in covered pathways failed, and underground 
pipes supplying fire retardant to reactors broke because of the 
relative movement between soils and the foundations.  In a two-
story steel building used for plant administration, drop-ceilings 
fell and windows broke.  Access through doors was impaired by 
ground settlements of up to 40 cm.  The plant was closed after 





Fig. 6: Kashiwazaki Wastewater Treatment Plan on the south 
side of Sabaishi River near its outlet to the Sea of Japan (Google 
Earth map site RK9 RK9 N 37.38748 E 138.56587)  Pipe breaks 
due to separation of two halves of building (Photo taken on 
7/21/07). 
 
Liquefaction During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki 
Earthquake 
Liquefaction was observed from the southern port of Kasashima 
village  south of Kashiwazaki City, to Shiya village north of the 
Kashiwazaki-Kawira Nuclear Power Plant.  Liquefaction 
evidence was seen in four general settings: riverbank deposits, 
beach deposits, dune sand, and placed fill. Along the Sabaishi 
River, liquefaction and lateral spreading features were observed 
for approximately five kilometers from the river-mouth.  River 
deposits near the sea liquefied and settled severely at the 
Kashiwazaki wastewater treatment facility (Fig. 6) causing the 
separation and differential settlement of two plant buildings. 
Upriver, liquefaction resulted in settlement and lateral spreading 
of the levee embankment near the Kai-Un Bridge (Fig. 7 and 8), 
a large water main pipe separation, and a large lateral spread 
along the river bank immediately east of the municipal 
incinerator. 
 




Figure 7:  Lateral Spread on  North side of Kai-Un Bridge area 
of the Sabaishi River (Google Earth map site RK6, N 37.39343
 E 138.58555, 7/19/2007). 
The U River, located in the southwestern portion of Kashiwazaki 
City, was further from the epicentral region and exhibited less 
liquefaction damage, all within one kilometer of the mouth of 
the river.   
A long, coast-parallel, surficial unit of dune sand extends within 
and north of the city.  This deposit was the source of numerous 
liquefaction failures, particularly along the edge of the modern 
flood plain (Figure 9). The sand was typically very soft under 
foot, and may have been reworked in areas by the ancient, 
meandering Sabaishi and U Rivers.  At one site liquefaction 
settled ground was observed around the foundation pile cap of a 
large high-voltage power transmission tower leading from the 
nuclear power plant.  Though the soil pulled away from the cap, 
the pile cap and tower had no indication of deformation (Figure 
10) 
Sandy fill deposits used for backfill for the wastewater and 
storm water drain network performed poorly throughout the 
epicentral region causing hundreds of separated and uplifted 
manholes that incapacitated the drains and impeded traffic 
(Figure 11).  Ports and harbors suffered only moderate levels of 
settlement and liquefaction-related lateral spreading.  
 
 
Figure 8:  Failure of reinforced concrete stack and a large 
liquefaction-induced lateral spread on the north side of the 
Sabaishi River (Google Earth map site SP31, N 37.3939° E 
138.5840°). 
 
Figure 9: Liquefaction and lateral downslope movement of 
underlying soil buckled the floor slab of a large warehouse store. 
(Google Earth map site RK41, N37.41468 E138.60840, 
7/22/2007). 
 





Figure 10: Settlement of ground adjacent to the grade beam 
between footings of a high voltage transmission line tower 





Figure 11:  Uplifted manholes from storm-water drains impeded 
traffic and compromised rainfall drainage throughout 
Kashiwazaki City and the surrounding villages. 
 
Landslides During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki 
Earthquake 
Landslides caused by the earthquake consisted of shallow 
translational slides, debris slumps, and deep-seated rotational 
slides.  In general, landslide activity was focused near the coast, 
with many steep (50° +) slopes experiencing shallow landsliding 
of overlying colluvial debris and residual soils (Fig. 12).   
 
Figure 12: Coastal landslides on Highway 352 north of 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant at road closure south 
of Route 373 (Google Earth map site RK34; N37.48455° 
E138.62435°; Photo taken 7/22/07). 
Shallow coastal landslides were observed to be 0.5 to several 
meters deep in colluvial and residual soils and ranged from 5 m3 
to several thousand cubic meters in volume.  Typical slope 
surface and failure plane inclinations were between 50° and 70°, 
failing in translation as debris slides and slumps.  Additional 
landslides also occurred some distance away from the main 
damaged areas (~10 km northeast of Kashiwazaki and 7 km east 
of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant) in an upland, 
mountainous region.  These slides also generally consisted of 
shallow translational events.  Where transportation lines crossed 
areas of steep terrain, landslides often blocked or destroyed 
whole sections of roadways and railways.  Three major 
transportation routes were blocked by landsliding in the region: 
the coastal road (Route 353) to the north of the Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Fig. 12), the railway to the south 
of Kashiwazaki, at the Oumigawa train station on the Shin-etsu 
Line (Fig. 13) and Highway 8, north of the intersection with 
Route 252 located inland from the coast 
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Figure 13: Landslide at the Oumigawa Train Station on the Shin-
etsu Line (Google Earth map site RK20/YT16/SA9; N37.34490° 
E138.48435°, 7/21/07) 
An area of dense landslide activity not investigated by the field 
reconnaissance team, but identified through helicopter 
reconnaissance by the Japanese Public Works Research Institute 
(PWRI) was identified approximately 20 km to the southeast of 
Kashiwazaki, in the Takayanagi-Machi region.  Because this 
area is located a significant distance away from other observed 
landslides from the earthquake, it is anomalous to the general 
pattern of observed seismic-induced geotechnical and structural 
damage and should be investigated more thoroughly. 
Embankment failures were typical in road fills both along the 
coast, and were also observed at three sites located further inland 
(Fig. 14).  Embankments underwent from 10 cm to in excess of 
one meter of vertical displacement, extending between 10 and to 
60 meters in length.  Three embankment failures required full 
closures of roads, and/or protection with tarps to reduce rainfall 
infiltration and the associated potential for additional movement.  
Among these was a 15-meter high, 97.5-meter wide, earth-fill 
dam located to the east of the region, where cracking through the 
midpoint of the crest was observed.  The water level at the time 
was well below the crest.  At a water supply dam located 
southwest from the city of Kashiwazaki, cracking of the crest 
was also observed along with minor concrete cracking and 
spalling on the upstream side.  Here, the reservoir water level 
was within several meters of the dam crest at the time of 
observation.  
 
Figure 14: Road embankment failure off Route 8 on the way to 
Kasashima (Site YT18; N 37.33325 ° E 138.46500°; Photo taken 
7/21/07) 
 
Damaged Houses with soil-wall construction During The 2007 
M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki Earthquake 
 
The earthquake caused the collapse of nearly eleven hundred 
houses in the Niigata prefecture in Japan. Damage to one-to-
three story wood buildings was observed along the 30-kilometer 
long coastal region between Hatsusaki, to the south, and Shiya, 
to the north. Damage extended inland to western Nagaoka, 12 
kilometers west of the coast.  The city of Kashiwazaki reported 
the highest number of collapses in the region. The structures that 
collapsed were almost exclusively wooden structures and 
unreinforced masonry fences.  Preliminary estimates of collapse 
rate were between 5 and 7% for buildings and houses in the 
vicinity of the K-NET instrument in Kashiwazaki.  A large 
fraction of the houses affected were of old-style heavy clay-tile 
kawara roofs with soil walls (Figure 15).  Soft story collapses 
occurred in buildings with open businesses on the ground floor.  
The business arcade of Higashi-Honcho Dori was particularly 
hard hit. 
 




Figure 15:  Typical collapse of a heavy kawara-tile roofed home 
supported by the weak & brittle tsuchi-kabe (“soil wall”) 
construction technique and wooden post and lintel frame. 
 
Bridge Damage During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki 
Earthquake 
 
Damage to bridges crossing the Sabaishi River (north of 
Kashiwazaki) and the U river to (south of Kashiwazaki) was 
caused by permanent deformation of embankments that run 
parallel to the rivers and preserved in bridge bearings (Fig. 16).  
Lateral and vertical deformations of embankments ranging from 
a few centimeters to about a meter were observed.  
Embankments cracked at their crests and, in instances, sand 
boils flowed upward through these cracks indicating 
liquefaction.  Larger ground deformation, and more damage to 
bridges was observed along the Sabaishi River compared with 
the U River. 
 
The bridges along the Sabaishi River consist of 15 to 100m-long 
continuous steel I-girder or reinforced concrete superstructures 
resting on elastomeric bearings supported by reinforced concrete 
piers and abutments.  The thickness of the bearings ranged from 
15 to 30 cm.  Bearings deformed where embankment slumping 
pushed abutments toward the river (Fig. 16). Deformations of 
bearings ranged from 7 to 17cm.  Cracks up to 1-cm wide were 
observed in reentrant corners of abutments.  Spalling of 




Figure 16:  Strained bearing (site SA18, N37.39041° 
E138.59052°; 7/21/2007) 
 
Vertical offsets at bridge approaches caused by soil settlement 
ranged from 5 cm to a meter (Fig. 17).  Asphalt or gravel fill was 
placed to permit cars to cross bridges.  Utility lines attached to 
bridges where approaches settled were damaged.  Settlement of 
approaches was observed at bridges crossing the Sabaishi and U 
rivers and bridges along the Hokoriku Expressway. 
 
Damage to Utilities During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki 
Earthquake 
According to the Niigata Prefecture Government, approximately 
$13 billion in damage occurred to the lifeline infrastructure as a 
result of this earthquake.  Several lifelines remained closed a 
month after the event. Water for the region is provided by 
reservoirs in the mountains north of Kashiwazaki and two of the 
three pipes carrying water into the city broke.  Pipe breaks were 
the result of landslides, lateral spreading, liquefaction, and soil 
settlement. Manholes blocked roadways when pipes rose due to 
soil liquefaction.  Damage to the wastewater treatment plant, 
including damage to pipes, clarifiers, sludge digesters, and other 
equipment by soil displacements and differential settlements, 
prevented removal of sludge from the system. 
 
In addition to the problems at the nuclear power plant, there was 
damage to the transmission system maintained by Tohoku 
Electric. Towers, transformers, and other equipment were 
affected by soil lateral spreading, soil settlement, and ground 
shaking.  There were five-minute to 10-hour power disruptions 
after the earthquake. Natural gas lines broke as a result of 
liquefaction and settlement of soils and pressurized tanks 
exhibited permanent displacements after the event. One month 
after the earthquake, restoration of service was ongoing.   
 
 
Figure 17:  Settlement of approach fill to bridges along the 
Sabaishi, here, and U Rivers created critical transportation 
hazards immediately following the earthquake.  
 
The high volume of calls following the earthquake and the 
damage to underground optical cable conduits in five locations 
impaired telephone and internet services. Approximately 5% of 
the fiber conductors in these cables were cut.  Power interruption 
longer than 10 hours impacted cellular phone services. The 
phone system was restored three days after the earthquake.  A 
phone emergency service system worked well during the 
earthquake.   
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 Geoengineering Damage to Transportation Systems During The 
2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki Earthquake 
Transportation systems were disrupted by landslides, lateral 
spreads, embankment slumping and spreading, bridge approach 
settlement, liquefaction of utility trench fills, and post-
earthquake sub-grade construction recovery efforts.  In many 
cases, roadways were blocked by landslide debris, in others, the 
roadfill and foundation failed requiring extensive repair.  
Despite the numerous road closures and pavement damage, 
significant progress was made toward repairing critically 
damaged roadways during the time of the reconnaissance. 
The most striking damage to the transportation network was 
caused by large landslides destroying sections of roads (Fig. 18).  
In one location, both lanes of a busy regional highway were 
moved down slope by about 10 m as a result of a deep-seated 
slope movement.  The road was re-opened less than seven days 
following the earthquake, which is a testament to the excellent 
Japanese post-earthquake response, and an illustration of the 
importance of deploying reconnaissance teams soon after 
earthquakes to record perishable data.  A large lateral spread 
affected a road near the Kashiwazaki municipal waste 
incinerator, forming a headscarp with a vertical offset of 2.5 
meters that transected the road.  The pavement was heavily 
damaged for a length of over 200 meters in the lateral spread 
(Figure 8). 
 
Figure 18: The Ozumi Senbon Landslide (Site RK1; E37.41422° 
N138.71347°) 
Embankment failures affected transportation access, closing 
partial to whole lanes.  In most cases, one lane remained open 
despite longitudinal ground cracks in many pavement sections 
that required cars to progress slowly and carefully over the 
damaged roadway.  Settlement of soils at bridge approach fills 
caused vertical offsets at many bridges by as much as one meter. 
(Fig. 17). Two tunnels were closed: one due to landsliding near 
the portal area and the other from unknown causes.  Pavement 
damage was widespread and caused by liquefaction of utility 
trench fills, and/or uplift of buried utilities due to buoyancy in 
liquefied ground.  Such damage typically caused closure of one 
lane of traffic, and in only a few cases were closure of entire 
roadways necessary due to utility trench fill liquefaction failures. 
Damage to railways was caused by landslides (for example, at 
the Oumigawa Train Station south of Kashiwazaki), settlement 
of foundation soils, spreading and slumping of railway 
embankments, and transient ground shaking.  Horizontal track 
offsets up to 30 cm were observed (Fig.19).  Liquefaction and 
resulting ground failure caused rail damage in many cases, but 
there were cases where rail offsets occurred without ground 
failure, presumably due to transient shaking. Some damage 
occurred to trains carrying passengers at the time of the 
earthquake - news reports immediately following the earthquake 
indicated that a stationary train tipped over at Kashiwazaki 
Station but that no one was injured.   
 
Figure 19: Lateral deformation of train tracks at Arahama 
Station (Site RK13; N37.40555° E138.60197°, 7/21/07) 
 
Port and Airport Damage During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-
Chuetsu Oki Earthquake 
 
The coastal location of this moderate-sized earthquake resulted 
in moderate damage to port and coastal infrastructure from the 
southwest, at the small village of Kasashima, to north of the 
town of Kariwa.  The Kasashima harbor exhibited negligible to 
very minor evidence of ground deformation and seismic effects 
to coastal infrastructure (e.g. quay walls, seawalls, breakwaters). 
Trace remnants of very small, localized ground deformations 
were observed, and it appears that the ground motions in this 
area were just strong enough for incipient lateral deformation of 
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 the ground and waterfront earth retention structures (Figure 20). 
The westernmost section of the Port of Kashiwazaki was 
subjected to the effects of widespread liquefaction, lateral 
spreading and settlement exceeding 30 cm in many areas and a 
pronounced graben formed between a port building and the 
waterfront quay wall. A pile supported structure performed very 
well, but two pedestrian-accessible roof areas on either side of 
the main structure were distressed by ground settlement and 




Figure 20: Kashiwazaki Harbor – Liquefaction induced lateral 
spreading and settlement of soil beneath a harbor-front caisson 
resulted in rotation toward the harbor and lateral displacement of 
the soil behind it (Site RK25, N37.36713 E138.53210, 
7/20/2007). 
 
Along the waterfront to the southwest of the Sabaishi River and 
transverse to the riverfront sheet pile wall is a seawall that 
extends southwest roughly 2.0 km towards the Minatomachi 
Seaside Park. On the north end of the seawall, the lateral wall 
movement was roughly 0.6 m and exhibited an increased 
seaward tilt to the southwest with lateral deformation of 
approximately 1.5 m to 2.0 m.  At the TEPCO Nuclear Power 
Plant liquefaction, ground settlement and tilting of a building 
were observed near the shore on the west of Unit 5.  
 
(II) THE NIIGATA KEN CHUETSU EARTHQUAKE OF 
OCTOBER 23, 2004 
The Mw 6.6 earthquake that struck Niigata Prefecture on the 
evening of October 23, 2004, was the most significant 
earthquake to affect Japan since the 1995 Kobe earthquake.  
Forty people were killed, almost 3,000 were injured, and 
numerous landslides destroyed entire upland villages. Landslides 
were of all types; some dammed streams, creating new lakes that 
threatened to overtop their new embankments and result in flash 
floods and mudslides.  Landslides and permanent ground 
deformations damaged roads, rail lines and other lifelines, 
resulting in major economic disruption. The numerous landslides 
resulted, in part, from heavy rain associated with Typhoon 
Tokage. At Nagaoka City, there had been 100 mm (4 inches) on 
October 20 and 13 mm (.5 inch) on October 21. The earthquake 
forced more than 100,000 people into temporary shelters, and as 
many as 10,000 will be displaced from their upland homes for 
several years, if not permanently. Total damages are estimated 
by Japanese authorities at US$40 billion, making this the second 
most costly disaster in history, after the 1995 Kobe earth-quake. 
 
Figure 21: Aftershock pattern and mechanism. The Unonoma 
Hills are approximately outlined by dashed ellipse, and the 
Shinanogawa Lowland is the white area to the west (adapted 
from original figure by Group for Joint Observation, Kyoto and 
Kyushu Universities). 
The epicenter was in northwestern Honshu, about 80 km south 
of Niigata City (population 500,000), a city well-known for 
liquefaction damage following the 1964 M7.5 earthquake. The 
2004 epicenter was beneath the Uonuma Hills along the 
Shinanogawa Lowland (Figure 21).  Though the 2004 
earthquake was felt in Niigata City, no damage or liquefaction 
was observed there. South (or upriver) of Niigata, toward the 
epicentral area, there are a number of smaller cities and towns on 
the plain and some industrial sites; the remainder of the plain is 
covered by wet rice farmland (i.e. rice paddies). Nagaoka 
(population 194,000) was the largest city significantly affected 
by the earthquake. It suffered minimal damage, but had highway 
and train service disruptions, school closures, and an influx of 
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 refugees from surrounding areas. More seriously damaged areas 
were the city of Ojiya (population 41,000) and surrounding rural 
areas, most notably the village of Yamakoshi (population 2,222) 
and the town of Kawaguchi (2000 population 5,748), which 
sustained JMA intensity 7, the maximum on that scale 
(approximately equivalent to MMI XI-XII).  The Joetsu 
Shinkansen crosses this region in a north/south direction and 
terminates in Niigata. One of its trains was derailed by the 
earthquake.   
Seismology And Strong Ground Motions During The 2004 
Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake 
The mainshock at 17:56:00 Japan time (08:56:00 UT) on 
October 23 had a moment magnitude Mw 6.6.  The epicenter 
(lat. 37.30, long. 138.84) was located 4 km east of the city of 
Ojiya (Figures 21 and 23). The main shock was followed by an 
aftershock sequence with four events of JMA magnitude 6 or 
larger, and 12 events of magnitude 5 to 5.9 (as of November 28), 
far more than usual for an event of this magnitude. There was no 
surface rupture observed with the earthquake, and the mainshock 
is currently not associated with any mapped fault. The focal 
mechanism of the main shock shows almost pure reverse 
faulting on a fault striking 30 degrees east of north, dipping 
down to the northwest at 54 degrees. The source area is 20-30 
km long, with down-dip widths of about 14 to 25 km.   
The earthquake occurred near the Sea of Japan in an area of 
relatively high seismicity. Within 100 km, there have been five 
other earthquakes greater than Mjma6 since 1941, including the 
1964 Mjma7.5 Niigata earth-quake. All the large earthquakes of 
the present sequence occurred beneath the mountainous region 
east of Ojiya, where there are mapped Neogene-Quaternary 
folds. Across the region, there are many mapped short 
lineaments (1-10 km) trending north-east-southwest, along with 
the recognized Muika-Machi-Bonchi-Seien fault (Geological 
Survey of Japan).   
 
Figure 22: Ojiya K-NET Seismograph NIG019. (top) PGA 1.33 
g EW, 1.17 g NS, and 0.83 g UD, and (bottom) 5% damped 
response spec-tra for two horizontal directions (source: NIED). 
 
The hypocenter was in the central or lower region of the fault, so 
the rupture propagated updip toward the east and along strike in 
the north-east and southwest directions, with a duration of about 
10-15 sec. The largest amount of slip was in an area about 10 km 
x 10 km in the region of the hypocenter. Strong hanging wall 
effects were manifested in the large peak accelerations recorded 
above and to the west of the fault at locations such as Ojiya, 
where 1.33g PGA and 128.7 cm/sec PGV were recorded 4 km 
west of the hypocenter (Figure 22). The largest recorded peak 
acceleration, 1.75 g (and 53.1 cm/sec PGV), was recorded at 
Tohkamachi (NIG021), located about 20 km south-southwest of 
the epicenter. Peak accelerations of 0.48g and 0.89g were 
recorded at Nagaoka and Nagaoka-Shisho, respectively, located 
16 km north of the epicenter. The peak acceleration recorded at 
Niigata City, at an epicentral distance of 70 km, was 0.11g. For 
comparison, the Mw 7.5 1964 Niigata earthquake, which caused 
the extensive liquefaction, was located offshore at an epicentral 
distance of about 55 km north of the city, and had a peak value 
of 0.16 g, with a longer duration in Niigata City. 
Aftershock hypocenters are distributed over a region that is 
about 30 x 20 km at depths ranging from 15 km to the surface, 
which roughly coincides with the area of the main-shock and 
larger aftershock rupture areas. The locations show a complex 
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 pattern of westward and eastward dipping structures that are 
associated with the mainshock and larger aftershocks. 
 
Figure 23: Map of affected area showing main effects of 
mainshock (adapted from KKC aerial photos). 
Geotechnical Aspects Of The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu 
Earthquake 
Landslides, liquefaction, and permanent ground displacements 
accounted for most of the physical and economic effects of the 
earthquake. Figure 23 shows the distribution of landslides 
caused by the earthquake, as well as areas where liquefaction 
was generally observed. The map also shows other effects 
discussed below. 
Landslides During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake 
Niigata Prefecture documents 442 individual landslides in this 
earthquake, although on the ground the number appeared even 
larger. Heavy rainfall in the days prior to the earthquake likely 
had a fundamental impact on the distribution and scale of 
landsliding. Bedrock throughout the area of major landsliding 
consists of a folded sequence of very weak and friable claystone 
and siltstone that is fairly nondurable, with interbedded 
sandstone and minor conglomerate. For the argillaceous bedrock 
materials, high antecedent moisture would tend to cause 
softening and strength reduction, as well as elevated pore or 
joint water pressures and seepage forces.  
Observed modes of slope failure included translational soil slips, 
deep-seated rotational slumps, debris-flows, slump-flow 
complexes, and large block slides. In some cases, the failures 
were clearly controlled by bedrock structure., Observations 
indicate that some preexisting (ancient) deep-seated landslides 
were not remobilized during the earthquake.  
 
Figure 24:  North-facing valley wall with extensive translational 
soil sliding into valley bottom, Yamakoshi epicentral area 
(photo: K. Kelson). 
The most widespread type of observed failure consisted of 
translational slip of the regolith and highly weathered bedrock 
materials on very steep slopes flanking floodplains and along 
incised river and creek channels. This type of failure generally 
involves the upper 1.5-3 m of soil, and slip appears generally to 
be concentrated along the interface between significant root 
growth and underlying highly weathered bedrock. Examples of 
this type of failure are shown in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 25: Typical debris flow, exhibiting a narrow path and 
long runout. 
Another commonly observed failure mode in areas of deep 
regolith was slump-flow complexes within colluvium-filled 
swales. If antecedent moisture conditions had not been so 
severe, it is probable that the significant flow characteristics 
commonly exhibited by these failures would not have been so 
prominent. Many debris flows with significant runout distances 
were triggered by the earthquake, as shown in Figure 25. In 
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 several cases, massive debris flows blocked natural drainage 
courses, forming landslide dams. These events have already 
resulted in the flooding of villages and infrastructure (Figure 
26), and there is potential for large sudden floods to initiate if 
the landslide dams are breached in an uncontrolled manner.  
 
Figure 26: Inundation of homes upstream of landslide dam 
(photo:K. Kelson). 
 
Figure 27: Block slide formed by bedding plane (sliding surface) 
and two sets of vertical joint release surfaces (photo: R. Kayen). 
An earthquake-triggered landslide dammed a river about 1 km 
west of Komatsugura. The landslide was a block slide that 
formed on a dip slope dipping about 15-20 degrees west.  As the 
block moved downslope, a large graben formed at the head of 
the landslide; the landslide moved across the canyon and 
completely blocked the drainage. A lake several kilometers long 
formed behind the dam and initially the lake was rising 15-20 
cm/day despite efforts to pump water over the dam. Several 
roads and structures had been inundated upstream. An 
emergency spillway was being constructed to prevent 
uncontrolled overtopping and catastrophic failure of the dam, 
which could inundate downstream communities in ten minutes. 
The landslide material consisted of weakly cemented Pliocene 
and Pleistocene sandstone and mudstone that is easily erodible. 
A classic example of a block slide can be seen in Figure 27. The 
mould (negative impression) of the block is defined by a 
bedding surface dipping at about 30° toward the freeface of the 
slope, along with vertical joint release surfaces intersecting the 
right side of the bedding plane. The overlying block of bedrock 
traveled on the order of 30m-50m, riding over the valley floor. 
This failure occurred along a hogback ridge, and bedding plane 
slides of similar or larger size were observed at several locations 


















Figure 28: Deep rotational slump, indicated by a block of back-rotated trees and agricultural land, beneath an approximately 30m-50m foot 
high headscarp (photo mosaic: R. Kayen).
A major landslide at Shiroiwa (White Rock) drew international 
attention because a mother and two young children were buried 
in their car. They were discovered about four days after the 
quake, with only the four-year old boy surviving.  
As the bedrock throughout the area of major landsliding is 
judged to be sufficiently weak under saturated conditions to 
permit development of continuous shear on curved surfaces, it is 
not surprising that deep-seated rotational slides occurred, much 
like classical soil slumping. Figure 28 shows a deep rotational 
slide, as evidenced by a block of back-rotated trees and 
agricultural land bordering an approximately 30m-50m high 
headscarp to the left. Farther downslope, similar back-rotated 
blocks were observed, and the estimated maximum depth of the 
sliding surface is on the order of one hundred meters. 
A major question remains regarding the influence of prior 
rainfall on slope stability. The extent of landsliding is very large, 
and the authors are not aware of other earthquakes of similar 
magnitude that have caused slope instability to this extent. If the 
earthquake had struck under normal soil moisture conditions, or 
relatively dry conditions, it is likely that the extent of landsliding 
would have been significantly less. 
This emphasizes that risk of prior rainfall should be considered 
in any evaluation of seismically induced slope instability. Due to 
the sparse population in the mountainous epicentral region, the 
number of resultant casualties was surprisingly small. However, 
seismically induced landslides under saturated ground conditions 
in areas of the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles would cause 
similar damages and many more casualties.   
 
 
Figure 29: Sand boils at the derailing site of the Johetsu 
Shinkansen (Oct. 25) (photo: K. Kiyono). 
Liquefaction During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake 
Evidence of liquefaction was widespread but sporadic, and was 
primarily confined to rice fields along the Shinano River and to 
backfill around sewer pipelines. Some sand boils were observed 
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 under the Shinkansen viaduct (Figure 29) near the site of the 
derailment, and under a few bridges. However, there was much 
indirect evidence of liquefaction. Liquefaction may have 
contributed to the many ground failures, particularly near 
Kawaguchi, though no sand boils were observed. Ground 
settlement on the order of tens of centimeters along the Uono 
and Shinano rivers, along with levee slumping, could have 
resulted from liquefaction. Ultimately, the amount of 
liquefaction and associated ground failure was less than that 
anticipated by members of the EERI reconnaissance team. 
Hillside Fill Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu 
Earthquake 
The hillside residential area of Takamashi, located on the eastern 
edge of Nagaoka, experienced significant slope failures during 
the earthquake. Takamachi is located on a natural hill at the edge 
of the Shinano valley and the native soil consists of early 
Pleistocene sand and silt. It is assumed that the area was 
constructed by cutting the top of the hillside and using this 
material as fill along the edges. In most places, the fill was 
confined by a 4m high rigid, concrete retaining wall. Four large 
sections of retaining wall failed catastrophically, with the soil 
sliding a significant distance downslope. Figure 30 shows one of 
the large failures, extending across the road and close to the 
adjacent homes. Four segments of the concrete retaining wall 
translated significantly during the earthquake, including one that 
came to rest within the trees downhill.  
 
Figure 30: Failure of hillside fill in Takamachi residential area 
(photo: E. Rathje). 
In addition to the catastrophic failures, severe cracking due to 
slope and retaining wall deformations was observed in many 
areas along the edge of the hill. As much as 1 m of downslope 
movement was observed, and these deformations caused 
significant damage to structures. No failures or ground cracking 
were observed in areas that did not have a retaining structure. 
The yellow and red tagged structures within the Takamachi area 
were almost completely concentrated in areas with adjacent 
slope failures and ground cracking.  Within the interior of the 
hillside area, only green-tagged structures were encountered. It 
appears that all of the structural damage in Takamachi can be 
attributed to the deformations and failures of the hillside slopes.   
Building Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu 
Earthquake 
As a generalization, building damage in this earthquake was 
surprisingly light given the high apparent ground motions. 
Traditional single-family Japanese houses of bamboo reinforced 
mud infill and heavy fired clay tile roofing performed very 
poorly being prone to pancake collapse. In the Niigata region, 
houses tend to have larger and more numerous interior columns 
and heavier roof beams, due to the heavy snows (up to 3 m) 
every winter. A substantial number of these buildings collapsed 
in Kawaguchi, although the effects of shaking and PGD were 
hard to differentiate. Damage in Ojiya was lighter, although 
there were still some collapses and heavily damaged houses. 
There was very little to no damage to houses of this type in 
Nagaoka.   
Within the last two decades, a newer type of residential 
construction has been increasingly built in the region, 
presumably due to the snow accumulations, in which the entire 
ground floor exterior wall is of reinforced concrete, with second 
and third stories of more traditional wooden construction. These 
buildings are significantly taller and larger than more traditional 
housing, and are more like U.S. housing in that they have 
shingle roofing rather than heavy clay tile. They fared very well 
in the earthquake, having benefited from more modern building 
codes and construction practices.  
Commercial and institutional buildings generally performed 
well, with some exceptions. A surprising success was a three-
story 1960s vintage reinforced concrete (RC) frame school 
building in Ojiya about 40 m from the 1.33 g PGA seismograph 
recording. The building was completely un-damaged, with the 
exception of a cracked brick chimney. Another success story 
was a large three-story hotel complex situated on the ridge 
directly above Kawaguchi. Despite having a landslide 
immediately adjacent, the building sustained no damage, with 
the exception of some minor pounding at a seismic joint between 
two parts. 
Large "big-box" stores are increasingly prevalent in Japan, and 
two were observed in Ojiya with precast cladding having fallen 
away from steel frames. Entry was denied, but extensive salvage 
and repair operations were observed. A ten-story concrete-clad 
building was observed to have classic shear cracking of 
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 columns, and an electronic chip fabrication plant was reported to 
have sustained heavy nonstructural damage. 
Lifeline Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu 
Earthquake  
After landslides, damage to lifelines was the most notable result 
of this earthquake. Roads and highways were damaged at 
numerous locations, with similar damage to rail lines. A historic 
first was the derailment at full speed of a Shinkansen (bullet) 
train. With that exception, transportation structures performed 
generally well in this series of earthquakes. There were no 
collapses; damages appeared to be limited and repairable, and 
not surprising given the level of ground motions. Of the bridge 
structures crossing the Uono and Shinano Rivers in the 
epicentral region, all but two of the highway bridges were 
immediately open for, at least, limited traffic after the 
earthquake.   The other two bridges were open for emergency 
vehicles. 
 
Figure 31: Typical damage to road in Uonoma Hills. (photo: R. 
Kayen). 
An unusual aspect of this earthquake was damage to 
transportation tunnels. Water and power systems sustained some 
damage, but were back in service within hours, except in the 
hardest hit areas.  
Road and Highway Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken 
Chuetsu Earthquake 
Landslides and permanent ground displacements of varying 
magnitudes seriously damaged roads at over 6,000 locations 
throughout the region. Virtually all roads in the Uonoma Hills 
were cut by landslides (Figure 31) and many pavements in the 
lowland areas were disrupted by floating manholes, settlements 
at culverts and bridge abutments, and general disruption of the 
paved surface.  
 
Figure 32: Derailed Shinkansen (Oct. 31) (photo: C. Scawthorn). 
Highway bridge structures generally performed well in the 
earthquake series, with the exception that significant settlement 
of approach fills was observed on many bridges. Several 
highway bridges suffered damage to piers and bearings, but 
closure of the bridge was not required. A unique feature of the 
region are pipes, carrying water at 13° C, embedded in concrete 
along many streets and roads; the water is sprayed on snow in 
the winter to melt it. Over 600 km of snow-melt piping exists in 
the region, and much of it was damaged.  Snow-plows cannot 
operate on such roads, so considerable disruption occurred 
during the first winter in areas where the pipes were broken 
when the snows came.   
There was extensive damage to roadbeds caused by ground 
failures. Significant damage was observed on the Shinkansen 
elevated viaduct, as well as on some local railway lines, but all 
appeared to be repairable. The Joetsu Shinkansen line carries 
360,000 passengers per day, and was scheduled to restore 
service on December 28, 2004. A northbound Shinkansen train 
derailed just south of Nagaoka City (Figure 32). As the train, 
traveling over 200 km/hr, was exiting a tunnel, the driver felt the 
earthquake and applied the brakes.  The train passed under a 
300-m-long covered section, and began to derail along a viaduct, 
approximately 500 m from the exit of the tunnel. 
The train engine came to rest approximately 1.9 km from the 
tunnel exit, taking over 1.5 km to stop. There were no reported 
injuries as a result of the derailment, which occurred entirely 
along a straight section of elevated, level viaduct through rice 
farms. The viaduct, constructed in the 1970s, is composed of 
several different types of segments with varying heights and 
section design, some of which were damaged in the earthquake. 
Ground cracking, ground settlement, and signs of significant soil 
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 softening were observed at many locations along the viaduct 
(Figure 29).  
 
Figure 33: Damaged piers of Joetsu Shinkansen Wanazu Bridge 
(Nov. 1) (photo: S. Ashford). 
In the town of Kawaguchi, the Joetsu Shinkansen railway bridge 
was damaged. Piers supporting the Wanazu Bridge over the 
Uono River suffered a flexural failure due to a reinforcement 
discontinuity, as shown in Figure 33. Several columns of a 
viaduct section just south of the bridge also failed. Tracks of the 
JR Joetsu Line were also damaged due to minor fill settlement in 
the Wanazu area. In Kawaguchi, rails were buckled in numerous 
locations, and several plain concrete piers of the JR Iiyama Line 
were damaged, while the superstructure remained intact.   
Several tunnels were damaged in this event, including the 8.6 
km Shinkansen tunnel, which had fallen lining at about mid-
length and buckled track. Spalled lining occurred in the Wanatsu 
Tunnel of National Route 17.  
The earthquake cut off all power, gas, water, and telephone 
service to Ojiya city. Upwards of 300,000 households in the 
region lost electric power. As of Sunday evening, the day after 
the earthquake, 98,000 homes in Ojiya and Nagaoka still lacked 
electric power. Water supplies were cut through most of the 
affected area, and the lack of telephone service added to the 
isolation of the mountain areas cut off by landslides. Many areas 
received water from tank trucks, dispatched from neighboring 
areas.   
Electric power was restored steadily, but as of October 26, 
34,000 households were still without power, mostly in Nagaoka 
and Ojiya. Tohoku Power employed 1,900 repair workers, but 
they were impeded in some places by damaged roads. Water and 
gas service took longer to restore, and as of October 26, 108,000 
households still remained without running water and 56,000 
without gas. Access was impeded by all the road closures. By 
November 3, power was restored to all but 2,300 households, 
mostly in evacuated parts of Yamakoshi and Ojiya.  
Nagaoka City receives its water from the Shinano River, 
upstream of the city. Water level in the river is raised by 
lowering gates across the river, and water is diverted into a pipe 
that carries the water to a treatment plant downstream of the 
gates. The earthquake disrupted power to the gates and also 
caused some damage to the wire rope machinery used to raise 
the gates, so the gates could not be lowered and the treatment 
plant received no water. As a result, the plant had to resort to 
emergency drafting from the Shinano River (Figure  34).  
Damage was more extensive at the Ojiya water treatment plant, 
which also draws its water from the Shinano via an intake 
structure and over the levee on an approximately 70-m long steel 
truss bridge. Differential displacements of the supports damaged 
the bridge, but did not cause collapse. In the plant, there were 
obvious signs of ground settlements, and the plant had sustained 
piping damage. The plant was back in operation in hours. From 
the plant, water is pumped to two large 25m diameter hilltop 
tank reservoirs, one on each side of the Shinano.  Some ground 
settlements had occurred around one of the tanks, and entry 
structures had collapsed, but the tank was largely undamaged 
and in operation. The hilltop location is within 1 km of the 1.33 
g PGA recording in Ojiya, and the hilltop had sustained 
landsliding and damage to nearby houses, and clearly had 
undergone very strong shaking.   
 
Figure 34: Emergency drafting of water from Shinano River for 
Nagaoka City Water Treatment Plant (photo: C. Scawthorn). 
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 Approximately 23 km from the epicenter is the Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, at 8,300 MW (7 units) the 
world’s largest Nuclear Power Station (NPS). The October 23 
main shock reportedly had no effect on the NPS, but a 
magnitude 5.2 Earthquake on November 4 caused Unit 7 to shut 
down automatically (other units operated at the rated thermal 
power). In Kawaguchi, the Shinkansen has a substation stepping 
power down from 63kv to 1500 volts(the service voltage for the 
Shinkansen catenaries). Transformers in the substation were 
significantly tilted due to liquefaction, but still operating, and 
otherwise the substation was undamaged.   
Social Impacts Of The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake 
The most seriously affected areas were small towns and villages 
near Nagaoka, especially the village of Yamakoshi, the town of 
Kawaguchi, and the city of Tokamachi. As is true in rural areas 
throughout much of Japan, the population has been in decline, 
with Yamakoshi and Kawaguchi declining by 11.9% and 5.9%, 
respectively, from 1995 to 2000. Nearly 40% of Yamkoshi 
residents and 25% of Kawaguchi residents are elderly. Although 
the earthquake occurred in mid-autumn, winter was rapidly 
approaching, and Niigata Prefecture is known to receive some of 
the heaviest snowfall in Japan. 
Because landslides cut off transportation and communication to 
many areas, it took some time for emergency services to identify 
damage and assess needs. There were re-ports of family and 
neighbors rescuing people from collapsed homes. By the 
morning after the Saturday evening earthquake, the Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) opened a disaster headquarters in Ojiya to 
coordinate relief efforts, and used 300 personnel, 21 helicopters, 
and 65 vehicles to transport food and water to evacuation sites. 
They also evacuated tens of thousands of residents to emergency 
shelters, and used helicopters to airlift stranded villagers from 
the hamlet of Shiotani.   
More difficult was reaching the isolated towns of Kawaguchi 
andYamakoshi, which initially depended on airlifted food and 
water until they could be rescued the following day. In 
Kawaguchi, about 300 people took refuge in an elementary 
school and awaited assistance. By Monday evening, relief 
supplies were coming in over the roads, but still with not enough 
food for the population. In Yamakoshi, 250 residents spent two 
nights in a gymnasium without power or water before being 
evacuated. All but six of Yamakoshi’s 2,200 residents were 
evacuated and taken to three sites in Nagaoka. The national 
government applied the disaster relief law to 29 localities, which 
meant that government would cover the cost of relief and 
shelter.   
Many people spent the first night in their cars, but by the day 
after the earthquake, 82,000 were staying in emergency shelters. 
In Ojiya, 14,500 people took refuge at 93 different evacuation 
centers, mostly school gymnasiums and public halls. Even in 
lightly damaged Nagaoka, more than 34,000 people were 
evacuated to temporary shelters. On Monday, October 25, 
thousands were airlifted from about 60 mountainous 
communities, which remained closed to road access. Thirty 
police and SDF helicopters were needed to evacuate residents of 
seven municipalities. By Tuesday, October 26, about 320 people 
were still stranded in five hamlets.   
Aftershocks and landslide dams posed continuing problems. A 
M5.2 aftershock on November 4 halted the bullet train line 
between Niigata and Nagaoka. It also closed down a section of 
the bullet train tracks that had just reopened. A M5.9 aftershock 
on November 8 again stopped the bullet train and closed a 
portion of the expressway to Tokyo. Continued rain during the 
ten days following the earthquake raised concerns about water 
behind the landslide dams in Ojiya and Yamakoshi. The Japan 
Meteorological Agency set up alarm units and surveillance cam-
eras at five landslide dams, the prefecture prepared pumps to 
lower the water levels, and the prefecture recommended 
evacuation of 101households containing 439 residents.   
As of November 28, authorities attributed 40 deaths to the earth-
quake. Although most died from building collapses, 
approximately 14 deaths were from stress-related illnesses 
following the earthquake. One hospital patient died when an 
artificial respirator detached during the earthquake. Five died 
from complications due to living in their cars, including blood 
clots from inactivity. As a result, the prefecture encouraged 
people to move into SDF tents or to stay in accommodations 
farther away. Elderly residents were especially susceptible to 
exposure and stress-related illnesses. 
Economic Effects Of The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake 
Agricultural activities in Yamakoshi were disrupted by the 
earthquake, and residents fear permanent consequences. The 
village’s main industry is the raising of carp, which it provides 
to decorative ponds throughout Japan. The cattle industry is 
another concern. Residents had to leave behind 1,000 cattle. In 
order to save his business, the largest cattle owner began ten 
days after the earthquake to airlift 700 cattle out of the village by 
helicopter, at considerable expense.  
Area industries were also affected.  Hokuetsu Paper Mills plant 
in Nagaoka shut down for several days, as did Matsushita 
Electric’s chip production center. The Niigata Sanyo Electric 
Plant in Ojiya, which employs 1,500 workers and is Ojiya’s 
largest employer, is closed indefinitely. An auto parts plant has 
been unable to resume its speedometer assembly line, which 
caused Honda Motor Company to halt auto production at four 
plants elsewhere in Japan. Other plants shut down for 
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 approximately one week, including Panasonic Communications, 
and Alps Electric Company. 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange fell on the Monday following the 
earthquake, with the largest losses to Japan Rail East, companies 
with production facilities in the area, and insurers. On the 
positive side, the Japan Times reported that shares of 
construction-related companies increased sharply November 1on 
the Tokyo Exchange, because investors anticipated a 
supplementary national budget to pay for reconstruction 
following the earth-quake and recent typhoons. However, 
reconstruction will be a challenge to homeowners, since only 
11.2 % of households in Niigata Prefecture have earthquake 
insurance, compared to 17.2 % nationally. 
First Application of LIDAR Technology for Earthquake 
Reconnaissance 
For the first time, a reconnaissance  team utilized LiDAR, a 3-D 
scanning-laser that can create high-resolution, three-
dimensional, digital terrain models of any surface, including 
earthquake-related ground, structural, and lifeline deformations. 
Approximately 30 laser scans of damaged roadways, structures, 
and displaced ground were taken with a tripod-mounted LiDAR 
apparatus, a portable device that models surfaces to a 




Figure 35: Photograph (below) and LiDAR image (above) of 
damage to the Juetsu Railroad portal at Kita-Horinouchi from 
the portal entrance. Lateral displacement of the portal in the 
photo is visible and measurable in the LiDAR scan. (: R. Kayen) 
An example of structural damage captured by the USGS LiDAR 
unit is presented in Figure 35, collected in the damaged portal of 
the Juetsu railroad tunnel, north of Horinouchi town. The portal 
is founded on a poorly compacted embankment fill that failed 
during the earthquake. The portal pulled away from the tunnel, 
settling vertically, sliding downslope, and rotating. In the 
photograph, the offset in the portal can be seen along the left 
wall of the tunnel, and the rotation can be seen in the ceiling. An 
oblique view of the LiDAR point-cloud data can be seen on the 
right. The left-lateral offset in  the portal is clearly visible in the 
LiDAR model. In the LiDAR imagery, precise centimeter-scale 
measurements can be made of the three-dimensional 
deformation of the structure. 
 (3) OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPTEMBER 26, 2003, 
TOKACHI-OKI EARTHQUAKE 
Seismological Aspects Of The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki 
Earthquake 
The 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake was the third event of 
magnitude 8.0+ to strike the southeastern portion of Hokkaido 
in the last 50 years. The earthquake hypocenter was located at 
latitude 41.9° north and longitude144.1° east, at a depth of 42 
km (Figure 1). The slip distribution inverted from seismograms 
shows this as a repeat rupture of the 1952 Tokachi-Oki M8.2 
event fault segment. Both events are megathrust earthquakes 
that result from segmented rupture of the Pacific plate beneath 
the Hokkaido-Tohoku accretionary prism.  
The primary M8.0 event occurred at 4:50 a.m. local time on 
September 26, 2003, and was followed by a second M7.1 
event at 6:08 a.m. Both events triggered ground failures along 
Paper 3.54  
 
20
 the southern coastal region of Hokkaido. The primary event 
produced tsunami run-ups along the shoreline of southern 
Hokkaido that reached maximum heights of 4 meters in the 
areas of Taiki and Erimo.  
Accelerations recorded by seismic networks of Hokkaido 
indicate a high intensity motion region from Hiroo area to 
Kushiro City, with a PGA values in the range of 0.35 to 0.6g 
(Figure 36). The highest PGA (1.0g) is an apparently anomalous 
recording at the Hiroo City Hall, behind the bluff overlooking 
the nearby Port of Tokachi (~0.45 g). Acceleration response 
spectra for Hiroo and Tomakomai are presented in Figures 37 
and 38, respectively. Despite high acceleration levels, the 
observed ground failure, liquefaction, structural, port, and 
lifeline damages were remarkably light. The reason for this is 
not fully understood, but may be associated with the unusually 
high frequency of the major loading cycles. Ground motion 
durations were typical of an M8 event. In the southeastern 
coastal areas close-in to the rupture, significant loading (>0.05g) 
had durations ranging from approximately 1.5-to-3 minutes. On 
the Japanese Shindo intensity scale, the region from Urakawa, 
west of Erimo peninsula to Kushiro felt intensity 5-6. Other 
portions of Hokkaido and northern Tohoku, Honshu felt motions 










Figure 36: Effects of the 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake. Peak ground accelerations and tsunami wave run-up heights were reported by 
JMA, PARI and other organizations. The region of damaged ground covered a 400 km wide swath along the coastal areas of southern and 
southeastern Hokkaido. Details and intensity of the damage effects are reported in damage quadrants described in the map legend. 
 




Figure 37: Acceleration response spectra for ground motions 
recorded at Hiroo at 5% damping.  
 
Figure 38: Acceleration response spectra for ground motions 
recorded at Tomakomai at 5% damping.  
Liquefaction During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake 
Liquefaction was observed over a broad geographic region, 
from Sapporo to Kitami, though it was quite dispersed and 
localized. In addition, it was almost exclusively limited to 
manmade fills. Locations where liquefaction was observed is 
presented on Figure 36, and examples are discussed here and in 
the following sections of the article as well.  
Sapporo is located approximately 200 km from the epicenter of 
the 2003 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake with recorded PGA of 0.07g. 
Liquefaction and structural damage was observed in Sapporo 
during the 1968 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake, and it was of interest 
to compare the performance between the two earthquakes. 
There was one isolated incident of liquefaction in the 
Utsukushigaoka suburb of southern Sapporo.  Several sand 
boils were observed in the 2500 m2 area, in a low spot in the 
surrounding neighborhood. Seven houses were damaged from 
settlement, and the most severely damaged had suffered a tilt of 
up to 2.5 degrees (Figure 39). Specific sites of observed 
liquefaction in the 1968 earthquake, specifically in the Nishi-
Naganuma area between the Ebetsu and Yubari Rivers did not 
have evidence of liquefaction during the 2003 event. Perhaps 
the most spectacular example of liquefaction was located in 
farming country in northeastern Hokkaido town of Tanno, 
approximately 10 km northeast of Kitami City. Here, four large 
ground failures occurred over a 1 km2 area as a result of 
liquefaction. 
 
Figure 39: Damage to houses in Utsukushigaoka suburb of 
southern Sapporo from liquefaction induced settlement. 
The largest of these was 50 m wide and 200 m long (Figure 40), 
and 5000 to 10,000 m3 of material is estimated to have been 
expelled. Though lateral movement of the 1.5 m soil cap was 
limited to perhaps 1 m, the cap settled nearly 3 m as a result of 
the loss and evacuation of the underlying sand, which clogged 
drainage culverts for 100's of meters down stream. Local 
weakly cemented volcanic ash deposits were used for the 
borrow material, and fills as thick as 5 to 8 m were placed 20 
years ago over former terraced rice fields for beet production.  
Performance of Port and Harbor Facilities During The 2003 
M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake 
Three major ports were affected by the earthquake, and for the 
most part performed very well. In the west, liquefaction was 
Paper 3.54  
 
23
 observed in the Port of Tomakomai, but there was no resulting 
damage. One oil storage tank was consumed by fire, and it is 





Figure 40: Flow failure in a farm field near Kitami City, where 5,000 to 10,000 m3 of volcanic ash fill soil was expelled from a single site 
as a result of liquefaction (Photo Mosaic: R. Kayen). 
 
The town of Hiroo hosts the Port of Tokachi, and damage in the 
port and town was relatively minor, even though accelerations 
as high as 0.6g were recorded in the port. Damage in the town 
was limited primarily to stucco and plaster damage to older 
buildings. Sand boils were widespread in new areas where the 
ground had been placed by hydraulic fill within the last 3 years. 
However, sand boils were not observed elsewhere at the port, 
where soil placed prior to 1993 had experienced two 
liquefaction triggering events during the significant 1993 
Kushiro-Oki and 1994 Hokkaido Toho-Oki Earthquakes. The 
height of tsunami run-up in the port was observed to be 2.5 to 3 
m, washing three cars and other debris into the harbor, but not 
causing structural damage to ports facilities.  
The Port of Kushiro was the most severely damaged of the ports 
on Hokkaido. The Port consists of 4 western piers (Piers 1 
through 4 on the west side of the Kushiro River), and several 
eastern piers including the Fishermen’s Terminal. Piers 1 
through 3 and the Fishermen’s Terminal were built prior to 
1993, and suffered liquefaction and structural damage from the 
1993 Kushiro-Oki and 1994 Hokkaido Toho-Oki Earthquakes. 
Piers 1 through 3, and to some extent the Fishermen’s Terminal, 
have been improved by stone columns and/or deep cement 
mixing since 1994. All have caisson type quay walls.  
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Figure 41. Lateral movement of 10 cm and settlements of 100 
cm were observed at Pier 4 of the Port of Kushiro, causing its 
closure. Piers 1 through 3 suffered minor damage and were 
quickly reopened.  
Pier 4 was the most heavily damaged, with lateral movements 
of the 14 m deep quay wall of approximately 10 cm, and 
settlements behind the wall ranged from 60 to 100 cm (Figure 
41). Sand boils were observed in an open area, approximately 
30 m from the wall behind a paved area. The paved area was 
underlain by mixed soil-cement, and it may be that settlement of 
rubble-fill beneath the soil-cement mixture, rather than 
liquefaction, was the cause of the observed damage. Directly 
adjacent to Pier 4 was a well-instrumented quay wall test 
section to study the behavior of improved and unimproved 
ground. With over 130 channels of data acquisition, including 
pore pressure transducers and downhole accelerometers, the 
data set from these earthquakes as well as many smaller 
earthquakes should provide a wealth of new information to 
researchers.  
The sections of Piers 1-3 that had undergone improvement 
performed well. The unimproved areas of Piers 1 and 2 suffered 
10 to 15 cm of settlement behind the quay wall, and some signs 
of liquefaction were observed in the interior of the both of these 
piers. Liquefaction and smaller settlements less than 10 cm 
were observed on Pier 3. Piers 1 through 3 were only briefly 
shut down for inspection directly following the earthquake. One 
section of Pier 4 with a hybrid caisson-type quay wall was 
closed for one day, then reopened. The remainder of Pier 4 
remains closed and will remain so for months.  
Liquefaction and settlements were observed at the Kushiro 
Fishermen’s Terminal, as well as lateral movement of the quay 
wall, and this new damage overprints unrepaired damage from 
the 1993 and 1994 earthquakes. One warehouse at the south end 
of the pier had suffered severe settlements and tilting from all 3 
earthquakes, yet still remains in operation, though leaning 
badly. 
 
Building Damage During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki 
Earthquake 
Building damage was also observed over a large geographic 
area, but with a localized and relatively limited character. 
Typical examples of the localized damage are the town halls of 
Kushiro and Taiki, where recorded PGA's were 0.46g. At the 
Kushiro Town Hall, the reinforced concrete entranceway 
collapsed, after the two columns supporting it failed. The 
windowed roof-observatory of the Taiki Town Hall collapsed as 
a result of strong shaking. In both cases, no other damage was 
reported in the main structures. Other buildings observed had 
been damaged from excessive settlement. The most significant 
was the Urakawa Elementary School, where spalling on 
concrete was observed on columns after the entrance settled 
(Figure 42). Other reported damage includes the airport at 
Kushiro, which was closed for one day due to the collapse of 
the non-structural hanging ceilings in the control tower and 
terminal building. A regional description of structural damage 
can be seen on Figure 36.  
For the most part, bridges performed quite well, with the 
exception of excessive relative movements between spans that 
led to shear key damage at the top of several piers, and some 
settlement of approach fills as noted earlier. All bridges were 
open to, though some were subjected to reduced speeds and lane 
closures. 
 
Figure 42. Damage to Urakawa Elementary School. 
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 Bridge Damage During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki 
Earthquake 
Examples of damaged bridge structures include the Shizukawa 
Bridge and the Tokachi-Kako Bridge northeast of Hiroo. The 
Shizukawa Bridge is located in Tomakomai area where the 
ground motion had recorded PGA was just over 0.1g, but was 
of long duration and dominantly long period motion. For this 
bridge, the relative movement between the abutments and first 
piers resulted in significant damage to the shear keys (Figure 
43), possibly as a result of pounding. Even so, the bridge did 
not collapse and was still in service. In all cases, no damage was 
observed in the columns or at the foundation level. All damage 
was concentrated at the pier-superstructure connection appeared 
to be the result of excessive relative displacement, either 
transverse or longitudinal, depending on the bridge.  
 
Figure 43. Damaged shear key from the Shizukawa Bridge near 
Tomakomai City.  
Tsunami During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake 
The main shock produced coseismic uplift of the seafloor 
southeast of the Hiroo Peninsula, generating a tsunami with 
shoreline wave heights of up to 4 m, and 2 to 3 m high in 
numerous locations, as shown in Figure 1. Two fishermen in 
Otsu were missing immediately following the tsunami, 
presumably drowned, and three cars were washed into the 
harbor at the Port of Tokachi. Other than that, the tsunami was 
responsible for very little damage. In many cases, the waves did 
not exceed the height of the tsunami barriers, and in locations 
were the backland was inundated, they were just barely so and 
damage was light.   Of great concern to the Japanese 
government and tsunami researchers were the high numbers of 
people not heeding the tsunami warning. Initial surveys 
indicated that perhaps 50 percent of the coastal residents 
ignored the issued tsunami warnings. 
Landslides During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake 
Reconnaissance carried out from a fixed-wing aircraft combined 
with automobile and foot traverses through the Hidaka 
Sanmyaku and other mountainous areas of southeastern 
Hokkaido failed to yield evidence of much significant landslide 
activity on natural slopes. The only known, minor damage from 
such landslides was a rock fall of perhaps a few hundred meters 
total volume that was reported from a steep slope adjacent to the 
coastal highway at Hiroo, However, material from this landslide 
had been rapidly removed after the earthquake. Other landslides 
from natural slopes observed by the reconnaissance team 
consisted of scattered small rock falls, rock slides, and debris 
slides from particularly steep slopes. These had volumes 
ranging from less than one-to-several thousand cubic meters 
each, and most were sourced from existing scars where such 
activity had clearly originated in the past as well.  
The earthquake produced several embankment and fill failures 
in the region around Toyoroko. These failures produced cracks, 
slumps, and in some cases lateral spreads accompanied by sand 
boils indicating an association with soil liquefaction.  These 
failures were most common in deep fills for highways that had 
been constructed to provide a smooth grade for roads passing 
from valley bottoms to adjacent upland areas. Locally, such fill 
and embankment failures caused significant damage, especially 
to roads 
Lifelines During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake 
Lifelines covered in this section that were affected by the 
earthquakes include sewers, roads, and other utilities. By far, 
the most widespread damage to lifelines was to the storm and 
sanitary sewer systems. Significant uplift of manholes was 
reported from Urakawa in the west to Hamanaka in the east. 
The team observed uplift as high as 2 m in Otsu (Figure 44) and 
dozens as high as 1.5 m in a single subdivision of Shintoyo-
Cho, immediately east of Kushiro City. In all cases, the uplift 
appeared to be related to liquefaction of the pipeline backfill 
material, and damage was aligned with the layout of the pipe-
network. Though the phenomenon appeared to be widespread, 
there were no reports of widespread sanitary sewer failures. 
Many had been repaired by the time the team came through.  
While damage to roads was not widely reported, the team 
observed widespread, but minor, damage to Highway 336 
between the Rekifuna River and Tokachi River. The approach 
fills to numerous small bridges experienced settlement and 
many had been patched with asphalt. In addition, many slumps 
were observed along the shoulder of the highway, but none 
large enough to affect traffic. In Chobushi, the team observed 
ground failure of Route 912, completely closing the road. This 
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 roadway failure appeared to be the result of collapse of a prism 
of embankment fill built over a lowland and culvert. With the 
exception of the ground failure on Route 912, most damage to 
roadways appeared to be relatively minor and more of a 
maintenance issue.  
There were no reports of power or telephone loss due to the 
earthquakes, though severely tilted telephone poles were 
observed near Kushiro. The team did observe a severed fiber 
optic cable on the Tokachi-Kako Bridge, where fill had settled 
60 cm relative to the abutment.  
 
Figure 44. Uplifted manhole near a sewage treatment facility in 




During the period from 2003- 2008 Japan was struck by seven 
events that resulted in damage ranging from light-to extremely 
heavy. The three worst events are described in detail in this 
paper, each with their unique characteristics. The 2007 Niigata 
Chuetsu Oki event was the first significant and damaging 
earthquake to strike close in to a large modern nuclear power 
plant. Damage at the plant has been the focus of intense 
investigation and documentation by the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company, the Nuclear Safety Commission Of Japan, and the 
United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. In the 
United States, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is 
documenting the lessons learned from this event in the hopes of 
improving the US response to earthquakes at nuclear power 
generating facilities. The 2007 Niigata Chuetsu Oki (offshore) 
earthquake primarily a “geotechnical earthquake”: liquefaction 
damage, poor response of dune sand deposits, and lateral 
spreading of river bank deposits were the major sources of 
damage. 
 
The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu (onshore) earthquake could be 
characterized as a “landslide earthquake”. Thousands of large 
and small downslope landslide and debris flow scars were 
observed throughout the Uonuma Hills of Central Niigata 
Prefecture. These landslides shattered the transportation and 
communication network, isolated villagers in small hamlets in 
upland hills and hindered emergency response activities. A 
large rockslide on the banks of the Shinano River destroyed a 
local transportation route and resulted in several fatalities.  
Liquefaction damage was relatively light during the event. 
 
The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi Oki earthquake occurred in almost 
nearly same location as the 1968 offshore earthquake. This 
event is noteworthy as a “tsunami earthquake” for the wave 
generated by tectonic uplift of the seafloor and the observed 
local wave run ups of 1-4 m on beaches along the southeastern 
shore of Hokkaido island. Despite the large magnitude of the 
earthuake and accelerations observed near the mouth of the 
Tokachi River and at Kushiro City, geotechnical and structural 
damage were relatively light. 
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